No. 25: Zimbabweans Who Move: Perspectives on International Migration in Zimbabwe

The movement of people across political boundaries has generated considerable debate in Southern Africa. There is a compelling need for Southern African countries to harmonise regional migration policies and to ensure the freer movement of people across the region. However, it must be noted that disparities in levels of development are still evident in the economies of the region. There are fears in countries such as South Africa and Botswana that the freer movement of people will flood them with migrants from the less developed countries. There are also concerns in all the countries of SADC that freer movement will not be well received by citizens, leading to intolerance and xenophobia. As Southern Africa moves towards a more globalised future, there is need for African governments to have the best information on which to make policy decisions. Migration policy is not static but undergoes constant modification as a country’s experiences with and perceptions of migrants change. Immigration policy is often a divisive issue on domestic political agendas. In times of economic recession, immigrants are unjustifiably blamed for high unemployment rates, increasing crime, and land and housing shortages. Politicians often give high priority to migration issues, sometimes alienating ethnic groups and substantially affecting immigration programmes. Immigrantsin pursuit of work have often become pariah citizens in a global order in which, paradoxically, old borders are rapidly dissolving. Rising xenophobia and violence against foreigners are sobering and sad reminders of the negative effects of globalisation. National governments have also been blamed for fuelling xenophobia by perpetuating stereotypes against foreigners, describing them as a ‘flood’ and stereotyping them as criminals. Invariably the way the government treats foreigners also determines the attitude of the local population towards the foreigner. This has also set the tone for a negative representation of foreigners in local newspapers. For example, it has been shown that antiimmigrant sentiments are widespread in South African print media which can also have an impact on the way the local population view foreigners. This has also set the tone for a negative representation of foreigners by officials in local media. The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) conducts basic research for policy-making on the dynamics of international migration to and within the SADC region. SAMP maintains that a well-informed policy- maker or migration manager is more likely to appreciate the viability of different policy choices and to develop policies that are workable, democratic and consistent with principles of good governance and regional cooperation. Policies based on outdated or misleading information will not only fail but have damaging consequences. From a human rights standpoint, such decisions could violate constitutional guarantees and exacerbate hostility towards non-citizens. SAMP is also committed to conducting such research at a regional scale. Research results from one country, such as Zimbabwe, can be compared with those from the other SADC states. This helps to highlight similarities and differences in national migration regimes but also helps define areas of potential cooperation and harmonization between states. SAMP therefore believes that the collection of reliable and accurate data on the dimensions, causes, impacts and trends in migration is an essential first step. Only then can there be informed debate and movement forward on regional harmonization. Within the Southern African region, Zimbabwe’s migration history is unusual. Historically, countries were either recipient or sending countries for migrants. Zimbabwe was always in the unusual position of being both. Over the years, many Zimbabweans went to work, primarily in South Africa. SAMP research shows, for example, that almost a quarter of adult Zimbabweans have parents and grandparents who have worked in South Africa at some point in their lives. On the other hand, Zimbabwe was a recipient of labour migrants from countries such as Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. At the time of the 1951 census, there were 246,000 foreign Africans in Zimbabwe (40% of them from Mozambique). Zimbabwe was a source, a destination and a corridor. Since independence, Zimbabwe has experienced considerable shifts in the inherited colonial migration pattern: Internal rural-urban migration and urbanization has increased dramatically, although the true extent of this trend will not be evident until the results of the latest census are available. Zimbabwe has become a far more significant exporter of migrant labour as economic conditions in Zimbabwe have deteriorated. Zimbabwe, unlike Mozambique and the BLS countries, has no international bilateral treaty facilitating such movements. As a result, there are only limited opportunities for Zimbabweans to work legally in South Africa. Significant undocumented migration began in the late 1980s and has increased ever since. Zimbabwe is no longer a major recipient of migrant labour except, perhaps, along the border with Mozambique. The volume of ordinary cross-border traffic between Zimbabwe and its neighbours has escalated dramatically over the last decade. Many more Zimbabweans are looking outside the country for the means of livelihood. In a 1997 SAMP survey, Zimbabweans were asked the purpose of their last visit to South Africa. Over 70% had an economic purpose for migrating with 29% going to work or look for work and 42% going to trade or to shop. Documentation and analysis of these trends and their importance for policy-makers has been relatively limited. As a result, in 1996 the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) entered into a partnership with the Department of Geography at the University of Zimbabwe to generate the research data that is urgently needed. This publication presents some of the results of that partnership. The first chapter provides a general overview of post-independence migration to and from Zimbabwe based on official and other published information sources. The author, Professor Lovemore Zinyama, begins by pointing out that Zimbabweans are a nation of migrants although international migration accounts for only a very small proportion of the total Zimbabwean population movements in any one year. Less than 5% of the total population is estimated to be non-Zimbabwean. In terms of immigration to Zimbabwe, Zinyama notes the shift in sources from Britain and the rest of Europe during the colonial era, to a much wider global catchment dominated by the African continent after independence. A second major shift has been in government policy away from active encouragement of permanent residence to the granting of timelimited residence and employment permits to expatriates. These trends are well documented although both have slowed in the late 1990s. Zimbabwe has also continued to be a recipient of undocumented migrants from its neighbours. The main shift identified by Zinyama is in patterns of migration from the country. Zimbabwe has become a significant brain exporter. The process has occurred in two waves; immediately after independence when skilled whites fled south and more recently, in the 1990s, with growing numbers of black Zimbabweans leaving in search of other pastures. The latter process has in some sense been slowed by the post- 1994 hostility of the South African government towards skilled immigrants from Africa. However, skilled Zimbabweans are now globally marketable and are leaving the country in growing numbers. The 2001 SAMP survey reported by Dr Dan Tevera in Chapter 3 asked a sample of urban Zimbabweans how much consideration they had given to leaving Zimbabwe. Seventy six percent of the respondents reported having considered leaving Zimbabwe, a sign of the times perhaps. The Zimbabwean brain drain is the subject of a forthcoming SAMP policy paper. Parallel with a growth in cross-border informal trading, there are indications that undocumented and unauthorized cross-border migration from Zimbabwe into neighbouring countries has increased markedly since the 1980s. Zinyama identifies two categories of undocumented migrant. The first are Zimbabweans who enter neighbouring countries, mostly Botswana and South Africa, through official exit ports, but then over-stay. The second category comprises those who leave Zimbabwe without valid travel documents and do not use official exit points. This includes individual “border hoppers” and those relying on trafficking syndicates. The numbers are impossible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy although surveys can and do provide important insights into the intentions, behaviours and strategies of the migrants. The second chapter in this publication provides important verification of this claim. As the author points out, the types, patterns, causes and impacts of the various forms of regional cross-border migration are complex and little understood. For instance, little is known as yet about who travels outside the country, why and how often. A great deal more is now known because of a SAMP public opinion survey amongst migrants conducted in 5 Southern African countries. The results of that regional survey have been exhaustively detailed and analysed in other SAMP publications. Here we include a paper by Lovemore Zinyama which focuses on the migration behaviour of Zimbabweans, as revealed in their answers to the standardized survey. Zinyama argues that in the last decade there has been a qualitative shift in the nature of migration between South Africa and Zimbabwe, accompanying changes in the political and economic conditions of both countries. Migration of young single men for work has continued and even grown. But economic crisis and decline in Zimbabwe have prompted a diversification of household survival strategies. Cross-border migration has become one in a basket of such strategies for many. Formerly, only young single men would migrate for economic reasons. Now growing numbers of women have joined the migration stream. Informal cross-border trade has become dominated by women seeking to supplement their family incomes, to clothe and educate their children. Money obtained while in South Africa is used to purchase goods for importation back to Zimbabwe and subsequent resale of those known to be in short supply at home. More recently, female Zimbabwean crossborder traders have been going to Mozambique, Zambia and even as far afield as Tanzania to purchase and bring home second-hand clothing and goods for resale. The new Zimbabwean migrant is typically a middle-aged family person who uses cross-border migration as one strategy for the survival of her/his family, particularly where this is an urban household. The majority of these people are engaged in a purpose-specific circulatory migration process, but one in which they are only spending very short periods of time in South Africa. In the second chapter, Zinyama provides a detailed demographic and behavioural profile of these new and old migrants from the SAMP survey. In addition, he shows that the migrants have become the target of extreme hostility from South Africans, particularly since 1994. Levels of intolerance are at an alltime high in South Africa, leading to the charge that South Africa is the most xenophobic population in the world. Zimbabweans (and Mozambicans) have been the usual targets of xenophobic sentiment and action on the ground. All Zimbabweans have come to be stereotyped as a social, economic and criminal threat to South Africans. These are clearly stereotypes with little basis in fact or appreciation of the benefits of increased trade and economic interaction between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Apologists for the xenophobic tendencies of South Africans have argued that South Africans are not unique, that similar views and attitudes are found throughout the SADC. Even if true, this does not exonerate South Africans. It simply means that the task of public and official education is that much greater. SAMP therefore set out to test this hypothesis, and to provide SADC governments with baseline information on their own citizens’ attitudes to migration, immigration and refugees. In 2001, SAMP implemented the National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS) in five SADC countries, including Zimbabwe. The results of the Zimbabwean NIPS are reported in the third chapter by Dan Tevera. The survey showed that, in general, ordinary Zimbabweans are more tolerant and welcoming than South Africans, have a greater appreciation of the benefits of migration to their country and have a much more developed understanding of the necessity for refugee protection. However, there is certainly no room for complacency. In the South African case, levels of hostility were high regardless of the race, age, education, economic status or gender of the respondent. In Zimbabwe, marked differences emerged around the variable of economic and employment status. Of the random sample of urban adults, 38% were engaged in formal employment and 18.5% in informal sector activities. A further 43.2% were unemployed. The answers to questions designed to test attitudes and knowledge consistently broke down along the employed/unemployed divide. They also broke down along the middle-class/poor divide. In other words, Zimbabweans fit the more classical profile in which middle-class, educated and economically-secure people are likely to be more tolerant and accepting of outsiders than the poor and unemployed. This would be a cause for concern given Zimbabwe’s economic crisis and the growth of poverty and unemployment. However, there is little evidence that Zimbabweans explicitly blame migrants and immigrants for this state of affairs (again in stark contrast to South Africans). Zimbabwean migration patterns are currently in a state of flux. It is commonly assumed that the country’s economic and political conditions over the last decade and more recently are influencing out-migration. However, it would be incorrect to suggest that the correlation is simple or direct. More skilled Zimbabweans are leaving but not all are able to do so and many choose to stay, hoping for a turnaround. The unemployed and retrenched are more restless and mobile and South Africa and Botswana are a definite draw card. However, as the South Africans have yet to appreciate, most are circular migrants and would much prefer that Zimbabweans had the same legal mechanisms of access to the South African labour market as do Mozambicans, Batswana, Swazi and Basotho. It is ironic that apartheid-era labour agreements, still in force, shut out Zimbabweans but welcome the others. Zimbabwe needs to seek a general bilateral labour agreement with South Africa, as well as working within the structures of SADC to encourage greater cross-border mobility in the region as a whole. The other major shift of the last decade, requiring a rational policy response on the part of both governments, is the massive growth of informal cross-border trade. Zimbabwe sits at the center of regional informal trade networks. Yet, despite the passage of a SADC Free Trade Protocol, there is still no framework in place for legal informal traders. They are shut out once again in the new South African Immigration Act. This is a gap which urgently requires attention, not least because it discriminates unfairly against women migrants. It is also obstructive of the new emphasis on trade and regional cooperation in SADC. The benefits of freer trade should not be confined to large companies, but to ordinary people as well

No. 29: The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe

All the signs point to the existence of a growing exodus of skilled Zimbabweans from the country. Although the precise dimensions and impacts of this “brain drain” have yet to be determined, the Zimbabwean government has recently sought to stem the tide with various policy measures. The education and health sectors appear to be the hardest hit although professionals in other sectors have also been leaving in numbers. The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) has undertaken a multi-country study of the brain drain within and from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SAMP’s primary contribution is to examine the skills base of a country and, on the basis of nationally-representative surveys, determine the future emigration potential of skilled people who remain. In other words, SAMP provides critical policy-relevant information on the likely course of the brain drain in the future and the effectiveness of policy measures that might be deployed to slow or reverse the brain drain. The Zimbabwean survey was conducted in 2001. A representative sample of 900 skilled Zimbabweans was interviewed to obtain information on personal and household economic circumstances; attitudes towards current and future economic, social and political circumstances; likelihood of emigration in the future; and attitudes towards measures designed to keep them in the country. The majority of the respondents (844) were African. Thus, the survey results are focused primarily on the emigration potential of black Zimbabweans. The white sample was too small to say anything of significance about white intentions. The respondents were drawn from a wide variety of professions and sectors and therefore represent a broad cross-section of skilled Zimbabweans. The first significant finding is that 57% of the sampled population have given a “great deal” of thought to emigrating from Zimbabwe (with another 29% having given the matter some thought). Only 13% have given it no consideration. A comparison with South Africa is germane since that country is widely believed to be undergoing a crippling brain drain. In South Africa, only 31% of the skilled population have given a great deal of thought to emigrating, with 31% having not thought about it at all. In terms of gender breakdown, more women than men have given a great deal of thought to emigrating (62% versus 54%), which is the opposite of the South African scenario. In age terms, it is Zimbabweans in the 25-35 age group who have given most thought to emigrating. Nevertheless, levels of dissatisfaction are so high that the majority in each age group have given at least some thought to leaving. As SAMP has demonstrated elsewhere, thinking about leaving and actually doing so are not the same thing. The survey therefore sought to establish the extent to which skilled Zimbabweans have made a mental commitment to leaving within a certain time frame. Respondents were therefore asked about the likelihood of their leaving within the next six months, two years, and five years. Over a quarter (27%) said it was likely or very likely that they would leave in six months. Fifty five percent were committed to emigrating within the next two years. And 67% said they were committed to emigrating within the next five years. These are sobering statistics, unmatched in any other country in the region in which SAMP has done similar research. They suggest that the pool of future emigrants in Zimbabwe remains massive. The firmest indication of migration potential, however, is whether a person has acted on their desires by applying for emigration documentation. Many emigrants do not, of course, apply until they are already overseas. However, the survey found that nearly 20% of the resident skilled population had either applied for or were in the process of applying for a work permit in another country. Another question addressed by the survey concerns the “permanence” of intended or likely emigration. This is an important issue. Are people so disillusioned that they wish to leave forever or would they return if conditions improved for them at home? The survey found that 51% expressed a strong desire to leave permanently (for longer than 2 years), compared with only 25% who have a strong wish to only leave temporarily. Again, 43% said they would prefer to stay in their most likely emigration destination for more than 5 years. This is not therefore a population that sees emigration as temporary exile. Why are so many Zimbabweans thinking seriously about leaving? The reasons for this extraordinary state of affairs can be analysed at two levels. First, it is possible to point to economic and political events over the last decade as the primary cause of emigration and high future potential. These events are too well-known to be repeated here. Instead, this survey sought to obtain the opinions of skilled Zimbabweans themselves, to statistically measure levels and forms of dissatisfaction and disillusionment and relate these to high emigration potential. The survey discovered extremely high levels of dissatisfaction with the cost of living, taxation, availability of goods, and salaries. But the dissatisfaction goes deeper than economic circumstances to include housing, medical services, education and a viable future for children. South Africans actually show similar levels of economic dissatisfaction but they are far more optimistic about the future than Zimbabweans. Asked about the future, there was deep pessimism amongst skilled Zimbabweans, with the vast majority convinced that their personal economic circumstances would only get worse. They were also convinced that social and public services would decline further. The respondents were also asked about their perceptions of political conditions in the country. Here, too, there was considerable negativity and pessimism. Ratings of government performance were extremely low. Various measures have been mooted in Zimbabwe with a view to keeping skilled people in the country, including compulsory national service and bonding. A coercive approach to the brain drain has not worked particularly well elsewhere and often have the opposite effect to that intended. The survey showed that such measures would only add to the burden of discontent and for around 70% of respondents would make absolutely no difference to their emigration intentions. Zimbabwe faces an immense challenge in stemming the exodus to other countries within Africa and oversees. The basic conclusion of this study is that coercive measures will not work and that the best way to curb the high rates of skilled labour migration lies in addressing the economic fundamentals of the country which will ultimately improve living standards. Regretably, most skilled Zimbabweans are very pessimistic that this will happen in the foreseeable future

No. 51: Migrant Remittances and Household Survival in Zimbabwe

Migrant remittances are now recognised as an important source of global development finance and there is increasing evidence that international remittances have considerable developmental impacts. The contribution of remittances to GDP in many developing countries is significant and has shown a steady increase over the past decade. However, while there is a consensus that remittance flows to Africa are increasing, little attention has been paid to the impact of these transfers on poverty alleviation, primarily because of data deficiencies at the household level. Despite their obvious magnitude, accurate data on remittance flows to Zimbabwe is unavailable or inaccessible. In an attempt to address such data deficiencies, SAMP devised the household-level Migration and Remittances Survey (MARS) which was administered in several SADC countries, including Zimbabwe. The MARS study was implemented in Zimbabwe in 2005 and surveyed 723 urban and rural households. The data generated by MARS is critical in at least three ways: (a) it quantifies the largely hidden economic value of labour migration from Zimbabwe; (b) it provides information on the significance of remittances to economic survival in a state undergoing massive formal sector decline; and (c) it provides information on the relationship between remittances and poverty alleviation at the household level. MARS allows us to do two things: first, to construct a profile of Zimbabwe’s migrant population and, second, to answer basic questions about remittance origins, volumes, channels and use. With regard to the migrant profile MARS found the following: Nearly three quarters of the migrants (72%) identified in the survey had worked outside the country for 5 years or less. Only 7% had been working outside the country for over 10 years. The number of migrants per household varied between one and five. The majority (73%) were reliant on a single migrant, and another 21% had two. Nearly 60% of migrants were in neighbouring countries, primarily South Africa (32%), Botswana (16%) and Mozambique (5%). The other 40% were outside Southern Africa in a wide range of countries. The United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada are primary destinations. Half of the migrants were sons and daughters or other relatives of household heads. However, the crisis in Zimbabwe is of such magnitude that household heads and spouses are migrating in significant numbers. Some 28% of the migrants were household heads and 13% were spouses/partners. More migrants were married (58%) than unmarried (31%). All of this suggests a broadening and deepening of participation in labour migration. In most countries in SADC, migration still tends to be heavily male-dominated. Zimbabwe has become an exception to this rule. In this study 56% of migrants were male and 44% female. The majority of migrants (72%) are under the age of 40. They are also relatively well-educated compared to migrants from other SADC countries. Less than 1% have no schooling and over 50% have a post-secondary diploma, undergraduate degree or postgraduate degree. Migrants are employed in a wide variety of jobs outside Zimbabwe, many not in the profession for which they have training or skills. In other words, this is a generalized out-movement of people, not confined to one or two professions or sectors. Nineteen percent of migrants were in the informal sector, followed by professional work (15%), health (12%), services (9%), teaching (7%), manual work (6%) and office work (5%). Comparing in-country with out-of-country employment by sector, the survey showed that 70% of Zimbabwean health workers were migrants; as were over 40% of professional workers, service workers, managerial office workers and mineworkers. Between 30- 40% of office workers and farm workers were also migrants. With teachers, the proportion was 28% and domestic workers 25%. Most migrants maintain close connections with Zimbabwe. Nearly half visit their families at least once every three months. However, almost 20% of the migrants (mostly living overseas) return home only once a year. Absences from home are highly variable: 18% are away for less than a month at a time, 19% between one and six months and 30% between six months and a year. Twenty percent are away for a year or longer. The survey also provided unprecedented insights into the remittance behaviour of Zimbabwe’s migrants, as well as invaluable information on the crucial importance of remittances to household survival. Although most migrant-sending households were struggling and poverty was increasing, very few could be considered destitute, at least on the evidence of this survey. However, without the constant and regular infusion of remittances from outside the country, the answers to this question would probably have been very different. Amongst the survey’s key findings on remittances were the following: The vast majority of migrants regularly send back remittances in cash and/or kind. In the year prior to the study, three-quarters of migrant-sending households received remittances. Migrants sent home R2,759 p.a. on average. Various factors influenced the amounts remitted by individual migrants. For instance, heads of households remitted more than their children. Men remitted slightly more than women, an indication of greater labour market access in destination countries. Those in the 40-59 age group remitted more than migrants in any other age category. Furthermore, those who were married remitted more on average than those who were still single. Remittances come from a diverse range of countries and wide range of sectors. Migrants overseas remit more on average than those within Southern Africa. Within the region, the largest remitters are in Botswana followed by Zambia and South Africa. Professional workers, on average, send the most money back to Zimbabwe, followed by self-employed entrepreneurs, office workers and managers. Surprisingly, unskilled manual workers remit more, on average, than health workers, teachers, domestic workers and workers in the service sector. Most migrants remit on a regular basis. Some 61% of households receive money from migrants at least once a month. Another 25% receive money at least once or twice every three months and 7% once or twice a year. There was a positive correlation between the amount remitted and the frequency of remitting: migrants who send money home more frequently remit more on average than those who remit less often. Migrants use many different channels to send remittances home. In Zimbabwe, there is a clear preference for trusted informal channels over banks and formal money transfer operators such as Western Union and Moneygram. Social networks influence the channels through which informal remittances are sent. Active social ties between migrants and family members and friends provide the personal links and local information necessary for informal remittance sending. Decisions about how much will be remitted, how often and through what channels are not the sole preserve of the migrant. Households are in regular contact with their migrant members by phone and regularly send requests for emergency assistance. Eighty percent of households reported that migrants can be relied on to send emergency remittances most or all of the time. As many as 61% of the surveyed households had received goods in the year prior to the survey. Non-cash remittances included foodstuffs (for example, maize-meal, sugar, salt, and cooking oil) as well as consumer goods such as bicycles, radios, sofas, agricultural inputs and building materials. Most non-cash remitting is based on the specific and immediate needs of the recipients. When the country faces shortages of basic commodities, non-cash remittances in the form of food tend to increase. How important are remittances to household survival and sustainability in Zimbabwe? A broad distinction is often drawn between productive and consumptive uses of remittances. Since most remittances to Zimbabwe are aimed at easing the livelihood constraints of the households back home, consumption tends to dominate remittance usage. The survey’s findings about remittance usage include: The vast majority of households receive cash and in-kind remittances. No other source of income came close in terms of the proportion of households that benefited. For example, despite the overall significance of informal sector trade only 15% of households generated income this way. A mere 6 % received income from the sale of farm products. Cash remittances were the major source of total household income, followed by wage work in Zimbabwe and remittance goods. The relative importance of remittances compared to other classes of income can be assessed via their importance to various basic household expenditure categories. Total expenses largely covered by remittances included gifts (93%), entertainment (92%), building (90%), clothes (88%), transportation (88%), education (88%), housing (85%), medical expenses (83%) and food and groceries (80%). The most common use of remittances is to buy food (by 67% of households), buy clothing (49%) and pay for school fees (48%). Domestic building materials are another common expense (by 49% of households) as are transportation costs (fuel and fares). The use of remittances to generate further income is not common although 27% of households used remittances to support food production and 12% purchased goods for re-sale. About 16% saved a portion of their remittances and 5% bought insurance policies. Nine percent spent remittances on funeral and burial policies and 8% on funerals – a clear indicator of the impact of HIV/AIDS. The MARS study clearly shows that without remittance flows, the situation of many Zimbabwean households would be even more dire than it is already. Remittances have reduced vulnerability to hunger, ill-health and poverty in both rural and urban households. Households with migrants go without basic necessities less often. Remittances have also allowed families to keep children in school and to put roofs over the heads of household members. Remittances, as a major source of household income, clearly have an important impact on livelihoods in Zimbabwe

No. 77: Living with Xenophobia: Zimbabwean Informal Enterprise in South Africa

South Africa’s crisis of xenophobia is defined by the discrimination and intolerance to which migrants are exposed on a daily basis. A major target of the country’s extreme xenophobia – defined as a heightened form of xenophobia in which hostility and opposition to those perceived as outsiders and foreigners is expressed through violent acts – is the businesses run by migrants and refugees in the informal sector. Attitudinal surveys clearly show that South Africans differentiate migrants by national origin and that Zimbabweans are amongst the most disliked. Zimbabweans are certainly not the only small-business owners to have become victims of extreme xenophobia. However, few studies to date have specifically examined the impact of xenophobic violence on Zimbabweans who are trying to make a living in the South African informal sector. This report is based on two sources of data: (a) in 2015, SAMP’s Growing Informal Cities (GIC) Project surveyed over 1,000 randomly selected migrant-owned informal sector enterprises in Cape Town and Johannesburg. The data on 304 Zimbabwean-owned enterprises included in the survey sample has been extracted for analysis; and (b) in 2016, 50 in-depth interviews were conducted with Zimbabwean informal business owners in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Polokwane who had been affected by xenophobic violence. The demographic profile of the Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs in the GIC survey included the following: As many as 60% of Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in Cape Town and 65% in Johannesburg are male. This was a marked contrast to informal cross-border trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa, which is dominated by female Zimbabweans. The number of migrant entrepreneurs who arrived in South Africa peaked between 2005 and 2010 at the height of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe and has since fallen. As many as 88% of the migrants in Cape Town arrived in the city after 2005 (compared to 52% of those in Johannesburg). Only 5% of the survey respondents had experience working in the Zimbabwean informal economy before migrating to South Africa. Those with prior experience had generally been involved in informal cross-border trading and were therefore familiar with South Africa. Relatively few of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs did not have documents permitting them to be in the country and/or to work legally. Just over one-third of the migrants in the survey had asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits but only 5% had refugee status (Section 24 permits). Around one-quarter had work permits and 10% had visitor’s permits. Only 15% did not have permits to reside and/or work in South Africa. The majority of the surveyed Zimbabwean enterprises were in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Most migrants did not start an informal business immediately on arrival in South Africa but first raised start-up capital through regular and casual employment. Against this backdrop, the report focuses on the findings from the in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean entrepreneurs. First, we review their experience of xenophobia and xenophobic violence. Most of the respondents recounted incidents of violence that had personally affected them. These accounts revealed a number of common features: To migrants, much of the violence occurs without warning and appears spontaneous. However, this is rarely the case as many attacks are preceded by community meetings from which migrants are excluded. They, therefore, have little ability or time to take evasive action. The perpetrators of xenophobic violence are often from the same community and are even personally known to their victims. The fact that migrant entrepreneurs provide goods, including food, at competitive prices and offer credit to consumers is clearly insufficient to protect them when violence erupts. In many areas, community leaders are ineffective in dealing with the violence and, in some cases, they actively foment hostility and instigate attacks. The looting of stock on the premises is a constant feature of the attacks. However, robbery per se is not the prime motive for the attacks. Virtually all agreed that the purpose of the attacks was not simply to steal certain desirable goods but to destroy their business premises and operations so that they could not continue to operate and would go back to Zimbabwe. South African business owners in the same vicinity are left alone during crowd violence. Attacks often involved vicious physical assaults against the person, accompanied by insulting xenophobic language. Many accounts describe how anti-government service delivery protests quickly disintegrate into mob violence and looting of shops owned by migrants. The looting is never indiscriminate and targets only migrants. Migrants feel that they are scapegoats for government failure to deliver services. There was some evidence of “violent entrepreneurship” involving attacks orchestrated by South African competitors. Xenophobic violence is gender-indiscrimate with male and female migrants recounting equally harrowing stories. The respondents differed on whether Zimbabweans were particular targets. Most said that all foreign-owned businesses were targeted. A number commented that the type of business made a difference, with food and grocery shops being especially vulnerable. The pervasive view amongst South African politicians is that xenophobia does not exist in the country. However, the term “xenophobia:” was used by all the rewspondents to describe the harassment and physical abuse that they experience and some even referred to the widespread violence in 2008 and 2015 as “the xenophobia.” The language and practices of xenophobia cow the victims into silence and a sense of helplessness. The interviews provide important insights into how migrant entrepreneurs respond to the threat and reality of xenophobic violence. Trying to “fit in “ and integrate by learning local languages, dress codes and cultural practices is one way to try to pre-empt attacks. However, these strategies are no guarantee of protection when mob violence breaks out. Some suggested that there was safety in numbers and that conducting business in areas where there were many other migrant businesses reduced the risks of being attacked. The downside of operating in safer spaces is that business competition is extremely fierce. Most are aware that a great deal of the xenophobic violence is confined to low-income areas, particularly informal settlements. While it is possible for some to avoid doing business in these areas, and to operate in areas of the city where attacks are less frequent, this is not feasible for all. Many Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa do not have the financial means to afford accommodation outside informal settlements and do not have the resources to run a business elsewhere. Several respondents noted that the unpredictability of the attacks made it difficult to plan in advance. Some said that they made sure that they did not keep all of their stock at the place of business, storing some at home or in rented containers. All tried to minimize the amount of cash they kept on the premises. Various reactive strategies were mentioned, including temporarily ceasing business operations, staying indoors at home, and moving in with friends or relatives in other parts of the city. None of the respondents said that xenophobic attacks would put them permanently out of business. On the contrary, most said that they would simply raise the capital and start again. The logical implication of this is that xenophobic violence fails in its two main aims: to drive migrant entrepreneurs out of business and to drive them out of the country. Many respondents made reference to the fact that the crisis in Zimbabwe meant that there was nothing for them to return to, even if they wanted to return

Harnessing Migration for Inclusive Growth and Development in Southern Africa

The primary goal of this study is to present the results of a comprehensive scope of key opportunities and challenges for harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development at the regional level in Southern Africa. The main objectives were as follows: Provide an overview of regional migration stocks and flows identifying regional trends, drivers and impacts from existing research literature and official data; Profile migrant characteristics at the regional level including demographic composition, types of migration and occupational profile; Examine the relevance of multilateral, continental and regional migration instruments, policies, protocols, agreements and forums with a view to identifying actions required to move the regional migration management agenda forward and align with the goal of enhancing migration for inclusive growth and development in Southern Africa; Analyze the key initiatives, opportunities and obstacles to developing a coherent, integrated and rights-regarding approach to migration management including areas of common commitment and ownership, and points of actual and potential conflict and disagreement between states; Conduct a gender analysis of regional migration dynamics including gender dimensions of migration, challenges, dangers and vulnerabilities confronting migrant women and other vulnerable groups, and gender analysis of migration management in Southern Africa; Identify potential programming areas that are weak or underdeveloped. The report relies on data and information from four main sources: (a) existing research literature and data on regional migration dynamics and trends in Southern Africa; (b) official data sources, where available, to identify current patterns, trends and types of migration; (c) bilateral global migration data sets compiled by the UNDP and the World Bank; and (d) a programme of field research involving key informant interviews and consultations with stakeholders, international organizations and donors, national government departments, and representatives from civil society, business, labour and the academy. Country visits were undertaken to South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana and Zimbabwe. A total of 60 interviews were conducted with 86 interviewees. The first two sections of the report outline the objectives and methodology of the research. The third section provides a contextual analysis of regional migration in Southern Africa to demonstrate that migration is a quintessentially regional issue and development challenge. There are a number of reasons why a regional – as opposed to a purely national – conceptual and policy approach to migration is desirable and necessary: Cross-border movements of people have a long history and constitute one of the major mechanisms of regional integration in Southern Africa (along with trade and investment). Goods and capital move relatively freely and legally across the region but people still face considerable obstacles and barriers to movement; Vast differences in levels of development and employment opportunities across the region have led to extremely uneven migration flows. All countries both send and receive migrants but the balance between the two varies significantly. Zimbabwe was a major destination before 2000 but has since become the region’s single largest exporter of migrants. South Africa is the major destination; Temporary, circular migration is the norm in the region with migrants retaining close ties with home countries and communities through formal and informal transfers of cash and goods in the form of remittances. In effect, migration and remittances have become a major source of development finance across the region; The majority of migration movements within and to the Southern African region fall into the category of South-South migration. This form of migration, from one developing country to another, can have positive and simultaneous development impacts on both countries of origin and destination; From a migration management perspective, regional organizations have recognized the importance of regional harmonization and co-ordinated action. However, governments have been slower to recognize the reality of regional migration, leading to a disjuncture between initiatives to facilitate movement and co-ordinate migration for development at the continental and regional level, and national governments that tend to view migration negatively and avoid any binding commitment to regional migration processes and instruments. The analysis of migration trends and flows distinguishes between (a) migration within the Southern African region from one country to another; (b) migration to Southern Africa from other countries, especially the rest of Africa; and (c) migration from Southern Africa to other parts of the globe. Each has implications and opportunities for harnessing migration for development and inclusive growth. For example: All of the countries of Southern Africa host some migrants, with the major migration destinations being South Africa, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi and Botswana. All are also migrant-sending countries with the major intra-regional senders being Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi and Angola. Even South Africa sends migrants to other countries in the region. In policy terms, this means that although many countries are threatened by what they view as an uncontrolled influx of migrants, they are themselves also migrant senders and beneficiaries of out-migration to other countries. Migration flows within the region have undergone major changes in the last two decades, including a significant decline in forced (refugee) migration, an equally significant increase in migration for economic and livelihood reasons, more diversity in flows including increasing female and youth migration, a decline in formal contract migration to South African mines, and a concomitant increase in unregulated, informalized migration across borders. Data and reliable information on all of these trends and their drivers are largely absent. In total, 53% of all Southern Africa-born migrants are living outside the region. The five major sending countries are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, the DRC and Mauritius. The five major destinations are the United Kingdom, Australia, France, the United States and Portugal. Shared histories and common languages have resulted in the emergence of migration corridors that include South Africa-UK, South Africa-Australia, Angola-Portugal, Zimbabwe-UK and Madagascar-France. The majority of migrants who leave the region are relatively skilled, leading to claims that countries of destination are responsible for a “brain drain” from the region. This argument has largely been replaced by the realization that these migrants are actually a resource with a potentially strong development role to play. Against the backdrop of complex and shifting migration patterns and flows, the report identifies key development-related implications of these migration trends and characteristics and presents relevant information and data on each. This provides substantive context and a link to the programming recommendations later in the report. The five areas are: (a) gender and migration; (b) migrant rights and protections; (c) migration and remittances; (d) migration and informal entrepreneurship and (e) diasporas for development. Although the available information on each area is uneven across the region, evidence is marshalled to suggest that each offers important opportunities for meeting the overall goal of harnessing migration for development and inclusive growth. These areas are united by a focus on the importance and development implications of women’s migration. The major findings from the analysis of these five areas include the following: Southern Africa is undergoing a process of feminization of migration with increased independent women’s migration. The number of female migrants in SADC is now over 2 million. In the major destination country (South Africa), the proportion of female migrants has reached 40% of the total. Gender-disaggregated data on migrant flows and occupations is generally unavailable, although South African data suggests that a migrant woman has only a 56% probability of being employed compared to a migrant man. There is a growing body of case-study evidence on informal temporary migration and the low wage regime and exploitative conditions in sectors such as construction, illicit mining, commercial agriculture and domestic work. For those migrant women who are employed, many are engaged in precarious livelihoods. Some are employed in potentially exploitative conditions with weak oversight or protection of their labour rights, for example as domestic or agricultural workers. Others are engaged in inherently precarious informal occupations such as trading, hair braiding and other beauty services, or craft production and sales, often conducted in unsafe spaces. Related to their precarious working and living conditions, female migrants experience gender-based violence and other health vulnerabilities. Poor treatment of female migrants on the way to and at the workplace exercises an extremely negative impact on the migrants themselves and their households, and is also antithetical to development and inclusive growth in their home countries. Low wages and other forms of financial extortion, for example, significantly reduce the remitting ability of migrants. Precarious employment in the agricultural and domestic service sectors is highly gendered with female migrants being most vulnerable to exploitation by formal and informal labour brokers and recruiters, employers and the authorities (especially the police). There is considerable evidence that remitting is an extremely common practice in Southern Africa. However, much remitting is through informal channels, and accurate data on remittance flows at the regional level is not available. The World Bank calculates that remittance flows to the countries of Southern Africa reached USD1 billion in 2014. Only a third of remittances to Southern African countries come from other countries within the region. Over two-thirds of remittances to Southern African countries therefore come from outside the region. Globally, female migrants send approximately the same per capita amount of remittances as male migrants but women tend to send a higher proportion of their income. Women also usually send money more regularly and for longer periods of time than men. In Southern Africa there is some evidence of distinct gender differences in remitting amounts, frequency and means of remitting, remittance recipients and use of remittances. This suggests that data, research and policy-making on migration and remittances needs to be gender-disaggregated. The number of migrants running small and microenterprises or being employed by these businesses is considerable in towns and cities across the region. In South Africa, as many as one-third of migrants are self-employed in the informal economy. Surveys of migrant entrepreneurs show that the sector is dominated by young people and that women occupy particular niches. Informal business owners have positive development impacts in countries of destination and origin through remittance of business profits, generating employment, rental of business properties, providing cheaper services, supporting formal sector businesses and payment of operating licences to municipalities. The major challenges to business survival and expansion include difficulties of securing start-up capital and business loans from formal financial institutions, especially banks; lack of basic business training and skills; exclusion from formal banking systems; vulnerability to xenophobic attacks and destruction of stock and businesses premises; and hostile operating environments including official harassment, extortion and demands for bribes or protection money. While many governments are developing plans and policies for diaspora engagement, an important information gap concerns the attitudes of diasporas themselves to engagement in development-related activities and initiatives in their countries of origin. A study of the global Zambian diaspora showed that most are interested in making private investments in Zambia, with the greatest sectoral interest in agriculture/horticulture, import/export, manufacturing, tourism and transport. Many expressed interest in contributing to development projects in Zambia related to education, healthcare, infrastructure development, childcare and microfinance initiatives. A study of immigrants from the SADC in Canada found that many felt they have an important role to play in developing their countries of origin. The majority remit money to their country of origin. Preferred avenues of engagement include skills transfer, investing in businesses, participation in development projects, educational exchanges, volunteer work, fundraising for development projects, philanthropy, export and import of goods to and from the country of origin, investing in infrastructural development and providing distance learning. Others specifically mentioned their desire to be involved in activities that would lead to greater empowerment for women and children. The next section of the report examines the policy implications of the information about migration flows and development implications provided in the previous section. There was a considerable degree of unanimity among the stakeholders interviewed for this study on the importance of seeing migration as a regional development issue requiring a co-ordinated regional response in Southern Africa. There was some expectation of a difference in opinion between regional and national stakeholders. However, many of the latter were also willing to acknowledge that migration was not purely an issue of national importance. Where they differed was on who should be driving the agenda: national governments or regional bodies. In principle, there is significant awareness among SADC member states about the need to strengthen efforts aimed at harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development. In practice, little progress has been made on mainstreaming migration and development at the national or regional policy level. Regional efforts to forge a common approach to migration appear promising but, while states appear willing to make initial commitments to agreements, instruments and initiatives, they are generally unwilling to ratify and implement anything that appears to infringe on their national sovereignty or the perceived interests of citizens. At the regional level, there is a paucity of instruments that focus directly on migration and development. An evaluation of the SADC Secretariat’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) has concluded that “the relationship between migration and poverty is under-represented in the plan’s proposed intervention areas and only addressed in a partial and circumscribed manner.” Freedom of intraregional movement has been a principle of the SADC since its foundation, although this is not explicitly tied to positive development outcomes. Despite this objective, unfettered free movement is very far from being a reality. The Secretariat has had no success in getting all member states to ratify its two major regional mobility policy initiatives: the 1995 Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and the 2005 Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons. Greater regional mobility initiatives are trumped by national immigration policies focused on movement control. SADC member states prefer to act bilaterally in their dealings with each other on migration through instruments such as Joint Permanent Commissions (JPCs) and Memoranda of Understanding. At the level of individual member states, the mandate and expertise required for, and resources devoted to, migration management is often limited to routine and operational capacity requirements, as opposed to a more strategic approach in which migration management is an essential component of development objectives. Little discernible progress has therefore been made with regard to the implementation of a free movement regime by the SADC Secretariat. In part, this is because there is very little data or analysis on exactly what the impact of removing border controls in the region would be. In many ways, the SADC is already a de facto free movement zone and the removal of controls would not have a massive impact on migration flows. What it would do is provide legal channels for those who want to migrate, reduce the opportunities for personal enrichment by corrupt state functionaries on both sides of borders, eliminate current high levels of corruption and abuse in the immigration system and reduce the exploitation of migrants who enjoy few rights and protections. However, free movement is likely to remain politically unpalatable to most states for the foreseeable future. One of the key components of inclusive growth strategies is poverty reduction through productive and decent employment. Given the high levels of poverty and inequality throughout Southern Africa, it is important to view migrant employment rights as an integral part of the inclusive growth agenda. The SADC Secretariat has made various efforts to put in place instruments that commit member states to protecting the rights of migrant workers. A recent study for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) examined the issue of migrant protection and rights in the Southern African region as a whole and identified the various regional-level commitments to protecting migrant rights and the obstacles to their implementation. This report examines various instruments including the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC, the SADC Code on Social Security, ILO Conventions 87, 100, 111 and 182, the Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (Domestic Workers Convention), the SADC Protocol on Employment and Labour, and the SADC Regional Labour Migration Policy Framework and concludes that, as with the effort to implement freedom of movement, ratification and implementation are proving problematical as few member states are willing to ratify the appropriate instruments. A gender analysis of the various African Union (AU) and SADC strategic instruments shows that gender and migration issues feature only in piecemeal fashion. Regional-level instruments, polices and protocols do exist, but these are barely enforced and national laws and institutions take precedence. The persistent limitations of migration governance on the continent are recognized as an obstacle to regional and continental poverty reduction. Furthermore, policies and instruments to protect migrant and gender rights are implemented within a difficult social and political context in which xenophobic and patriarchal attitudes persist. In sum, there are many challenges in advancing gender-sensitive, rights-based migration governance in the SADC region. The scale, complexity and diversity of migration, combined with incomplete and inconsistent data, make it difficult to measure and monitor the gender composition of migrant flows and stocks, or to understand the particular contributions and vulnerabilities of female migrants. A dual focus on empowerment and protection should guide programming and policy development on gender and migration in the region. The final section of the report makes specific recommendations for a future regional programme on harnessing migration for development and inclusive growth. Given the lack of progress at regional and national level in advancing a migration and development agenda, we argue that programming should focus on “demonstration” projects that provide clear evidence of the development impacts of migration for countries of origin and destination. These projects could then be scaled up. In order to establish priority entry points, the report does three things: Presents the results of the stakeholder perceptions of priorities in which knowledge and information gaps were a recurrent theme; Analyzes and categorizes the recommendations for making migration work for development in the SDGs, the Valetta Accord and various AU and SADC agreements, protocols and instruments; Develops a Programming Framework (PF) consisting of 10 core migration and development issues and 27 associated potential entry points; and This analysis leads to the identification of five major entry points in the programming framework under the general rubric of a recommended programme on Gender and Migration for Development and Inclusive Growth in Southern Africa. For each point, the report provides a detailed rationale, examples of similar programmes and likely outcomes. In summary, the five recommended entry points are as follows: Entry Point One: Building a Gendered Knowledge Base on Migration. One of the recurrent themes in the stakeholder interviews was (a) the limited public availability and utility of official data on migration; and (b) the lack of knowledge about regional migration causes, volumes, experiences and impacts. A common failing of official data and the case-study research literature is the absence of systematic and generalizable information on the gendered nature of migration. In order to provide detailed, policy-relevant, gender-disaggregated data on migration and its development impacts, a different methodological approach is needed. There is a need for the collection of national migration data at the household level in countries

No. 69: Calibrating Informal Cross-Border Trade in Southern Africa

Informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is a significant feature of regional trade and international mobility in Southern Africa. The exact number of participants and economic importance of this trade is unknown because no official statistics are collected. Despite its obvious presence at every border post throughout the SADC region, ICBT remains largely invisible to policy-makers. Indeed, in government circles it is more often associated with smuggling, tax evasion and illegality than with innovation, enterprise and job creation. On the research side, there is a growing body of case study evidence that ICBT plays a critical role in poverty alleviation, food security and household livelihoods in Southern Africa. But its overall character and significance is unknown. With this in mind, SAMP initiated a project to examine cross-border regional trade at a selection of important border posts throughout the region. This research led to a number of country reports that provided rich insights into ICBT in particular countries. This report combines the data collected by each of the country teams and analyses the data set as a whole. The first issue addressed in the report is whether ICBT traders are a homogenous group. The research shows that this is far from being the case and that more attention needs to be paid to different types of traders and trading activity. Second, the report examines the activities of cross-border traders including the types of goods traded, the sources of those goods and where they are sold. While the majority of traders purchase goods from formal outlets in their countries of destination, most of these goods enter the informal economy on their return home. Third, the report examines financial transactions at the borders showing that most traders pay extremely small amounts of duty, which hardly justifies the effort of collecting it. On the other hand, only a small minority collect the VAT they are owed when they leave the country of purchase. Finally, the report itemizes the problems and challenges faced by informal traders when crossing borders. In total, the SAMP survey covered 20 land border posts connecting 11 Southern African countries using a threefold methodology. First, all people crossing through the selected border posts were monitored over a 10-day period and the number of ICBT traders counted. Second, the interactions of traders with customs officials were observed and the types, value and volumes of goods declared and duties paid were recorded. Third, a sample of traders was interviewed using an origin and destination (O&D) survey. During the course of the exercise, more than 205,000 people, including 85,000 traders, were counted passing through these border posts. The transactions of over 5,500 traders with customs officials were monitored and over 4,500 traders were interviewed. The study demonstrates that informal cross-border is a complex phenomenon and not uniform across the region, or even through border posts of the same country. However, the overall volume of trade, duties paid and VAT foregone, as well as the types of goods and where they are produced, indicate that this sector of regional trade should be given much greater attention and support by governments of the region as well as regional organizations such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), SADC and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The major findings at the regional level were as follows: Demographically, women comprise a significant proportion of traders and constitute the majority of traders crossing through nearly half of the border posts surveyed, including one of the busiest at Beit Bridge between South Africa and Zimbabwe. At the same time, an unexpectedly large number of men were also involved in ICBT. Malawi and Zambia had significantly more male than female traders, for example. Most ICBT is bilateral in character; that is, traders tend to operate between their home country and one other country. Trading into a third country is comparatively rare. At the same time, the vast majority of traders crossing into a country with goods to sell are citizens of that country. ICBT by traders of other nationalities is uncommon. Although South Africa is a major source of goods purchased by traders, the absence of South African informal traders was very noticeable. The reasons why South Africans do not participate in ICBT requires further exploration but it stands in marked contrast to formal sector regional trade where South African companies predominate. ICBT is a neglected market opportunity for small-scale South African entrepreneurs and the obstacles to their participation need to be better understood. The majority of traders travelled frequently to other countries for short visits (sometimes for less than a day) to buy goods to sell in their home country, or to sell goods that they had bought for that purpose in their home country. Only 13% of respondents bought and sold goods while travelling (two-way trading). Frequency of tracel also varied both within and between countries, with traders in the Namibian (42%) and Zambian (25%) surveys being most likely to travel every day. Others travel at least once a week (Mozambique, 67%; Zambia, 34%). Some travel less frequently, but at least once a month. Very few stay more than a month in another country. The types of goods carried by informal cross-border traders vary widely, but at most borders the trade was dominated by food, especially groceries and fresh produce. Again, there was considerable variability at different borders. New clothes, household and electrical goods comprised a significant proportion of the stock of some cross-border traders. Other goods identified in the survey included second-hand clothing, petrol, alcohol, car parts and construction materials. Traders mostly source their goods from the formal sector of destination countries. A small proportion obtain their goods from informal markets in other countries. Many traders acted as wholesale importers of goods, selling the goods they carried across borders to vendors in informal markets. Others sold from their own stalls in informal markets, door to door, or to networks of family, friends and other individuals. A small proportion sold to retailers and restaurants in the formal sector. The value of goods carried by traders indicates the complexity and diversity of this sector. A significant cohort of traders appeared to be survivalists as many said they carried less than ZAR500 worth of goods. However, at least some of these traders travel frequently with low-value loads, rather than infrequently with high-value loads. Most traders travelled with loads in the range of ZAR1,001-5,000. A small cohort of traders travelled with loads worth more than ZAR15,000. Informal traders make a relatively significant contribution to duties collected at border posts. During the 10-day survey period at the 20 border posts, ZAR3,750,000 was collected from 1,780 traders. Duties collected varied between and within border posts. In some surveys the value of duties paid per trader was less than ZAR50. Interestingly, duties were being incorrectly collected at some borders between Southern African Customs Union countries (for example, between Botswana and Swaziland and South Africa). Traders said they were willing to pay duties, but wanted amounts reduced and the process to be more transparent. Although most traders buy their goods in the formal sector, few claim VAT when leaving the country of purchase. Many did not know they could do this while others said that the systems are too complex and time consuming. Traders who do not claim VAT back make an unintended contribution to the fiscus of the country where they buy their goods. Responses to questions about treatment from officials at the borders were generally positive but varied between and within border posts. Larger and busier posts generally received less favourable reviews. The scope and scale of informal cross-border trade across the SADC suggests that it makes a significant contribution to regional trade and the retail economies of the region and is consistent with the stated aims of both the SADC and COMESA to promote intra-regional trade. Small-scale cross-border trade could, if promoted and supported, provide a route to the development of pro-poor trade policies that could have a direct impact at the household level. If trade policies for the region are to be successful, the activities of these entrepreneurs need to be included in planning processes. ICBT comprises a significant component of regional economic activity for most countries in Southern Africa. It is highly visible at border posts throughout the region. Only amongst policy-makers and governments does it remain largely invisible

No. 02: The State of Urban Food Insecurity in Southern Africa

The number of people living in urban areas is rising rapidly in Southern Africa. By mid-century, the region is expected to be 60% urban. Rapid urbanization is leading to growing food insecurity in the region’s towns and cities. This paper presents the results of the first ever regional study of the prevalence of food insecurity in Southern Africa. The AFSUN food security household survey was conducted simultaneously in 2008-9 in 11 cities in 8 SADC countries. The results confirm high levels of food insecurity amongst the urban poor in terms of food availability, accessibility, reliability and dietary diversity. The survey provides important insights into the causes of food insecurity and the kinds of households that are most vulnerable to food insecurity. It also shows the heavy reliance of the urban poor on informal food sources and the growing importance of supermarket chains

No. 51: Migrant Remittances and Household Survival in Zimbabwe

Migrant remittances are now recognised as an important source of global development finance and there is increasing evidence that international remittances have considerable developmental impacts. The contribution of remittances to GDP in many developing countries is significant and has shown a steady increase over the past decade. However, while there is a consensus that remittance flows to Africa are increasing, little attention has been paid to the impact of these transfers on poverty alleviation, primarily because of data deficiencies at the household level. Despite their obvious magnitude, accurate data on remittance flows to Zimbabwe is unavailable or inaccessible. In an attempt to address such data deficiencies, SAMP devised the household-level Migration and Remittances Survey (MARS) which was administered in several SADC countries, including Zimbabwe. The MARS study was implemented in Zimbabwe in 2005 and surveyed 723 urban and rural households. The data generated by MARS is critical in at least three ways: (a) it quantifies the largely hidden economic value of labour migration from Zimbabwe; (b) it provides information on the significance of remittances to economic survival in a state undergoing massive formal sector decline; and (c) it provides information on the relationship between remittances and poverty alleviation at the household level. MARS allows us to do two things: first, to construct a profile of Zimbabwe’s migrant population and, second, to answer basic questions about remittance origins, volumes, channels and use. With regard to the migrant profile MARS found the following: Nearly three quarters of the migrants (72%) identified in the survey had worked outside the country for 5 years or less. Only 7% had been working outside the country for over 10 years. The number of migrants per household varied between one and five. The majority (73%) were reliant on a single migrant, and another 21% had two. Nearly 60% of migrants were in neighbouring countries, primarily South Africa (32%), Botswana (16%) and Mozambique (5%). The other 40% were outside Southern Africa in a wide range of countries. The United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada are primary destinations. Half of the migrants were sons and daughters or other relatives of household heads. However, the crisis in Zimbabwe is of such magnitude that household heads and spouses are migrating in significant numbers. Some 28% of the migrants were household heads and 13% were spouses/partners. More migrants were married (58%) than unmarried (31%). All of this suggests a broadening and deepening of participation in labour migration. In most countries in SADC, migration still tends to be heavily male-dominated. Zimbabwe has become an exception to this rule. In this study 56% of migrants were male and 44% female. The majority of migrants (72%) are under the age of 40. They are also relatively well-educated compared to migrants from other SADC countries. Less than 1% have no schooling and over 50% have a post-secondary diploma, undergraduate degree or postgraduate degree. Migrants are employed in a wide variety of jobs outside Zimbabwe, many not in the profession for which they have training or skills. In other words, this is a generalized out-movement of people, not confined to one or two professions or sectors. Nineteen percent of migrants were in the informal sector, followed by professional work (15%), health (12%), services (9%), teaching (7%), manual work (6%) and office work (5%). Comparing in-country with out-of-country employment by sector, the survey showed that 70% of Zimbabwean health workers were migrants; as were over 40% of professional workers, service workers, managerial office workers and mineworkers. Between 30- 40% of office workers and farm workers were also migrants. With teachers, the proportion was 28% and domestic workers 25%. Most migrants maintain close connections with Zimbabwe. Nearly half visit their families at least once every three months. However, almost 20% of the migrants (mostly living overseas) return home only once a year. Absences from home are highly variable: 18% are away for less than a month at a time, 19% between one and six months and 30% between six months and a year. Twenty percent are away for a year or longer. The survey also provided unprecedented insights into the remittance behaviour of Zimbabwe’s migrants, as well as invaluable information on the crucial importance of remittances to household survival. Although most migrant-sending households were struggling and poverty was increasing, very few could be considered destitute, at least on the evidence of this survey. However, without the constant and regular infusion of remittances from outside the country, the answers to this question would probably have been very different. Amongst the survey’s key findings on remittances were the following: The vast majority of migrants regularly send back remittances in cash and/or kind. In the year prior to the study, three-quarters of migrant-sending households received remittances. Migrants sent home R2,759 p.a. on average. Various factors influenced the amounts remitted by individual migrants. For instance, heads of households remitted more than their children. Men remitted slightly more than women, an indication of greater labour market access in destination countries. Those in the 40-59 age group remitted more than migrants in any other age category. Furthermore, those who were married remitted more on average than those who were still single. Remittances come from a diverse range of countries and wide range of sectors. Migrants overseas remit more on average than those within Southern Africa. Within the region, the largest remitters are in Botswana followed by Zambia and South Africa. Professional workers, on average, send the most money back to Zimbabwe, followed by self-employed entrepreneurs, office workers and managers. Surprisingly, unskilled manual workers remit more, on average, than health workers, teachers, domestic workers and workers in the service sector. Most migrants remit on a regular basis. Some 61% of households receive money from migrants at least once a month. Another 25% receive money at least once or twice every three months and 7% once or twice a year. There was a positive correlation between the amount remitted and the frequency of remitting: migrants who send money home more frequently remit more on average than those who remit less often. Migrants use many different channels to send remittances home. In Zimbabwe, there is a clear preference for trusted informal channels over banks and formal money transfer operators such as Western Union and Moneygram. Social networks influence the channels through which informal remittances are sent. Active social ties between migrants and family members and friends provide the personal links and local information necessary for informal remittance sending. Decisions about how much will be remitted, how often and through what channels are not the sole preserve of the migrant. Households are in regular contact with their migrant members by phone and regularly send requests for emergency assistance. Eighty percent of households reported that migrants can be relied on to send emergency remittances most or all of the time. As many as 61% of the surveyed households had received goods in the year prior to the survey. Non-cash remittances included foodstuffs (for example, maize-meal, sugar, salt, and cooking oil) as well as consumer goods such as bicycles, radios, sofas, agricultural inputs and building materials. Most non-cash remitting is based on the specific and immediate needs of the recipients. When the country faces shortages of basic commodities, non-cash remittances in the form of food tend to increase. How important are remittances to household survival and sustainability in Zimbabwe? A broad distinction is often drawn between productive and consumptive uses of remittances. Since most remittances to Zimbabwe are aimed at easing the livelihood constraints of the households back home, consumption tends to dominate remittance usage. The survey’s findings about remittance usage include: The vast majority of households receive cash and in-kind remittances. No other source of income came close in terms of the proportion of households that benefited. For example, despite the overall significance of informal sector trade only 15% of households generated income this way. A mere 6 % received income from the sale of farm products. Cash remittances were the major source of total household income, followed by wage work in Zimbabwe and remittance goods. The relative importance of remittances compared to other classes of income can be assessed via their importance to various basic household expenditure categories. Total expenses largely covered by remittances included gifts (93%), entertainment (92%), building (90%), clothes (88%), transportation (88%), education (88%), housing (85%), medical expenses (83%) and food and groceries (80%). The most common use of remittances is to buy food (by 67% of households), buy clothing (49%) and pay for school fees (48%). Domestic building materials are another common expense (by 49% of households) as are transportation costs (fuel and fares). The use of remittances to generate further income is not common although 27% of households used remittances to support food production and 12% purchased goods for re-sale. About 16% saved a portion of their remittances and 5% bought insurance policies. Nine percent spent remittances on funeral and burial policies and 8% on funerals – a clear indicator of the impact of HIV/AIDS. The MARS study clearly shows that without remittance flows, the situation of many Zimbabwean households would be even more dire than it is already. Remittances have reduced vulnerability to hunger, ill-health and poverty in both rural and urban households. Households with migrants go without basic necessities less often. Remittances have also allowed families to keep children in school and to put roofs over the heads of household members. Remittances, as a major source of household income, clearly have an important impact on livelihoods in Zimbabwe

No. 25: Zimbabweans Who Move: Perspectives on International Migration in Zimbabwe

The movement of people across political boundaries has generated considerable debate in Southern Africa. There is a compelling need for Southern African countries to harmonise regional migration policies and to ensure the freer movement of people across the region. However, it must be noted that disparities in levels of development are still evident in the economies of the region. There are fears in countries such as South Africa and Botswana that the freer movement of people will flood them with migrants from the less developed countries. There are also concerns in all the countries of SADC that freer movement will not be well received by citizens, leading to intolerance and xenophobia. As Southern Africa moves towards a more globalised future, there is need for African governments to have the best information on which to make policy decisions. Migration policy is not static but undergoes constant modification as a country’s experiences with and perceptions of migrants change. Immigration policy is often a divisive issue on domestic political agendas. In times of economic recession, immigrants are unjustifiably blamed for high unemployment rates, increasing crime, and land and housing shortages. Politicians often give high priority to migration issues, sometimes alienating ethnic groups and substantially affecting immigration programmes. Immigrantsin pursuit of work have often become pariah citizens in a global order in which, paradoxically, old borders are rapidly dissolving. Rising xenophobia and violence against foreigners are sobering and sad reminders of the negative effects of globalisation. National governments have also been blamed for fuelling xenophobia by perpetuating stereotypes against foreigners, describing them as a ‘flood’ and stereotyping them as criminals. Invariably the way the government treats foreigners also determines the attitude of the local population towards the foreigner. This has also set the tone for a negative representation of foreigners in local newspapers. For example, it has been shown that antiimmigrant sentiments are widespread in South African print media which can also have an impact on the way the local population view foreigners. This has also set the tone for a negative representation of foreigners by officials in local media. The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) conducts basic research for policy-making on the dynamics of international migration to and within the SADC region. SAMP maintains that a well-informed policy- maker or migration manager is more likely to appreciate the viability of different policy choices and to develop policies that are workable, democratic and consistent with principles of good governance and regional cooperation. Policies based on outdated or misleading information will not only fail but have damaging consequences. From a human rights standpoint, such decisions could violate constitutional guarantees and exacerbate hostility towards non-citizens. SAMP is also committed to conducting such research at a regional scale. Research results from one country, such as Zimbabwe, can be compared with those from the other SADC states. This helps to highlight similarities and differences in national migration regimes but also helps define areas of potential cooperation and harmonization between states. SAMP therefore believes that the collection of reliable and accurate data on the dimensions, causes, impacts and trends in migration is an essential first step. Only then can there be informed debate and movement forward on regional harmonization. Within the Southern African region, Zimbabwe’s migration history is unusual. Historically, countries were either recipient or sending countries for migrants. Zimbabwe was always in the unusual position of being both. Over the years, many Zimbabweans went to work, primarily in South Africa. SAMP research shows, for example, that almost a quarter of adult Zimbabweans have parents and grandparents who have worked in South Africa at some point in their lives. On the other hand, Zimbabwe was a recipient of labour migrants from countries such as Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. At the time of the 1951 census, there were 246,000 foreign Africans in Zimbabwe (40% of them from Mozambique). Zimbabwe was a source, a destination and a corridor. Since independence, Zimbabwe has experienced considerable shifts in the inherited colonial migration pattern: Internal rural-urban migration and urbanization has increased dramatically, although the true extent of this trend will not be evident until the results of the latest census are available. Zimbabwe has become a far more significant exporter of migrant labour as economic conditions in Zimbabwe have deteriorated. Zimbabwe, unlike Mozambique and the BLS countries, has no international bilateral treaty facilitating such movements. As a result, there are only limited opportunities for Zimbabweans to work legally in South Africa. Significant undocumented migration began in the late 1980s and has increased ever since. Zimbabwe is no longer a major recipient of migrant labour except, perhaps, along the border with Mozambique. The volume of ordinary cross-border traffic between Zimbabwe and its neighbours has escalated dramatically over the last decade. Many more Zimbabweans are looking outside the country for the means of livelihood. In a 1997 SAMP survey, Zimbabweans were asked the purpose of their last visit to South Africa. Over 70% had an economic purpose for migrating with 29% going to work or look for work and 42% going to trade or to shop. Documentation and analysis of these trends and their importance for policy-makers has been relatively limited. As a result, in 1996 the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) entered into a partnership with the Department of Geography at the University of Zimbabwe to generate the research data that is urgently needed. This publication presents some of the results of that partnership. The first chapter provides a general overview of post-independence migration to and from Zimbabwe based on official and other published information sources. The author, Professor Lovemore Zinyama, begins by pointing out that Zimbabweans are a nation of migrants although international migration accounts for only a very small proportion of the total Zimbabwean population movements in any one year. Less than 5% of the total population is estimated to be non-Zimbabwean. In terms of immigration to Zimbabwe, Zinyama notes the shift in sources from Britain and the rest of Europe during the colonial era, to a much wider global catchment dominated by the African continent after independence. A second major shift has been in government policy away from active encouragement of permanent residence to the granting of timelimited residence and employment permits to expatriates. These trends are well documented although both have slowed in the late 1990s. Zimbabwe has also continued to be a recipient of undocumented migrants from its neighbours. The main shift identified by Zinyama is in patterns of migration from the country. Zimbabwe has become a significant brain exporter. The process has occurred in two waves; immediately after independence when skilled whites fled south and more recently, in the 1990s, with growing numbers of black Zimbabweans leaving in search of other pastures. The latter process has in some sense been slowed by the post- 1994 hostility of the South African government towards skilled immigrants from Africa. However, skilled Zimbabweans are now globally marketable and are leaving the country in growing numbers. The 2001 SAMP survey reported by Dr Dan Tevera in Chapter 3 asked a sample of urban Zimbabweans how much consideration they had given to leaving Zimbabwe. Seventy six percent of the respondents reported having considered leaving Zimbabwe, a sign of the times perhaps. The Zimbabwean brain drain is the subject of a forthcoming SAMP policy paper. Parallel with a growth in cross-border informal trading, there are indications that undocumented and unauthorized cross-border migration from Zimbabwe into neighbouring countries has increased markedly since the 1980s. Zinyama identifies two categories of undocumented migrant. The first are Zimbabweans who enter neighbouring countries, mostly Botswana and South Africa, through official exit ports, but then over-stay. The second category comprises those who leave Zimbabwe without valid travel documents and do not use official exit points. This includes individual “border hoppers” and those relying on trafficking syndicates. The numbers are impossible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy although surveys can and do provide important insights into the intentions, behaviours and strategies of the migrants. The second chapter in this publication provides important verification of this claim. As the author points out, the types, patterns, causes and impacts of the various forms of regional cross-border migration are complex and little understood. For instance, little is known as yet about who travels outside the country, why and how often. A great deal more is now known because of a SAMP public opinion survey amongst migrants conducted in 5 Southern African countries. The results of that regional survey have been exhaustively detailed and analysed in other SAMP publications. Here we include a paper by Lovemore Zinyama which focuses on the migration behaviour of Zimbabweans, as revealed in their answers to the standardized survey. Zinyama argues that in the last decade there has been a qualitative shift in the nature of migration between South Africa and Zimbabwe, accompanying changes in the political and economic conditions of both countries. Migration of young single men for work has continued and even grown. But economic crisis and decline in Zimbabwe have prompted a diversification of household survival strategies. Cross-border migration has become one in a basket of such strategies for many. Formerly, only young single men would migrate for economic reasons. Now growing numbers of women have joined the migration stream. Informal cross-border trade has become dominated by women seeking to supplement their family incomes, to clothe and educate their children. Money obtained while in South Africa is used to purchase goods for importation back to Zimbabwe and subsequent resale of those known to be in short supply at home. More recently, female Zimbabwean crossborder traders have been going to Mozambique, Zambia and even as far afield as Tanzania to purchase and bring home second-hand clothing and goods for resale. The new Zimbabwean migrant is typically a middle-aged family person who uses cross-border migration as one strategy for the survival of her/his family, particularly where this is an urban household. The majority of these people are engaged in a purpose-specific circulatory migration process, but one in which they are only spending very short periods of time in South Africa. In the second chapter, Zinyama provides a detailed demographic and behavioural profile of these new and old migrants from the SAMP survey. In addition, he shows that the migrants have become the target of extreme hostility from South Africans, particularly since 1994. Levels of intolerance are at an alltime high in South Africa, leading to the charge that South Africa is the most xenophobic population in the world. Zimbabweans (and Mozambicans) have been the usual targets of xenophobic sentiment and action on the ground. All Zimbabweans have come to be stereotyped as a social, economic and criminal threat to South Africans. These are clearly stereotypes with little basis in fact or appreciation of the benefits of increased trade and economic interaction between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Apologists for the xenophobic tendencies of South Africans have argued that South Africans are not unique, that similar views and attitudes are found throughout the SADC. Even if true, this does not exonerate South Africans. It simply means that the task of public and official education is that much greater. SAMP therefore set out to test this hypothesis, and to provide SADC governments with baseline information on their own citizens’ attitudes to migration, immigration and refugees. In 2001, SAMP implemented the National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS) in five SADC countries, including Zimbabwe. The results of the Zimbabwean NIPS are reported in the third chapter by Dan Tevera. The survey showed that, in general, ordinary Zimbabweans are more tolerant and welcoming than South Africans, have a greater appreciation of the benefits of migration to their country and have a much more developed understanding of the necessity for refugee protection. However, there is certainly no room for complacency. In the South African case, levels of hostility were high regardless of the race, age, education, economic status or gender of the respondent. In Zimbabwe, marked differences emerged around the variable of economic and employment status. Of the random sample of urban adults, 38% were engaged in formal employment and 18.5% in informal sector activities. A further 43.2% were unemployed. The answers to questions designed to test attitudes and knowledge consistently broke down along the employed/unemployed divide. They also broke down along the middle-class/poor divide. In other words, Zimbabweans fit the more classical profile in which middle-class, educated and economically-secure people are likely to be more tolerant and accepting of outsiders than the poor and unemployed. This would be a cause for concern given Zimbabwe’s economic crisis and the growth of poverty and unemployment. However, there is little evidence that Zimbabweans explicitly blame migrants and immigrants for this state of affairs (again in stark contrast to South Africans). Zimbabwean migration patterns are currently in a state of flux. It is commonly assumed that the country’s economic and political conditions over the last decade and more recently are influencing out-migration. However, it would be incorrect to suggest that the correlation is simple or direct. More skilled Zimbabweans are leaving but not all are able to do so and many choose to stay, hoping for a turnaround. The unemployed and retrenched are more restless and mobile and South Africa and Botswana are a definite draw card. However, as the South Africans have yet to appreciate, most are circular migrants and would much prefer that Zimbabweans had the same legal mechanisms of access to the South African labour market as do Mozambicans, Batswana, Swazi and Basotho. It is ironic that apartheid-era labour agreements, still in force, shut out Zimbabweans but welcome the others. Zimbabwe needs to seek a general bilateral labour agreement with South Africa, as well as working within the structures of SADC to encourage greater cross-border mobility in the region as a whole. The other major shift of the last decade, requiring a rational policy response on the part of both governments, is the massive growth of informal cross-border trade. Zimbabwe sits at the center of regional informal trade networks. Yet, despite the passage of a SADC Free Trade Protocol, there is still no framework in place for legal informal traders. They are shut out once again in the new South African Immigration Act. This is a gap which urgently requires attention, not least because it discriminates unfairly against women migrants. It is also obstructive of the new emphasis on trade and regional cooperation in SADC. The benefits of freer trade should not be confined to large companies, but to ordinary people as well

No. 29: The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe

All the signs point to the existence of a growing exodus of skilled Zimbabweans from the country. Although the precise dimensions and impacts of this “brain drain” have yet to be determined, the Zimbabwean government has recently sought to stem the tide with various policy measures. The education and health sectors appear to be the hardest hit although professionals in other sectors have also been leaving in numbers. The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) has undertaken a multi-country study of the brain drain within and from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SAMP’s primary contribution is to examine the skills base of a country and, on the basis of nationally-representative surveys, determine the future emigration potential of skilled people who remain. In other words, SAMP provides critical policy-relevant information on the likely course of the brain drain in the future and the effectiveness of policy measures that might be deployed to slow or reverse the brain drain. The Zimbabwean survey was conducted in 2001. A representative sample of 900 skilled Zimbabweans was interviewed to obtain information on personal and household economic circumstances; attitudes towards current and future economic, social and political circumstances; likelihood of emigration in the future; and attitudes towards measures designed to keep them in the country. The majority of the respondents (844) were African. Thus, the survey results are focused primarily on the emigration potential of black Zimbabweans. The white sample was too small to say anything of significance about white intentions. The respondents were drawn from a wide variety of professions and sectors and therefore represent a broad cross-section of skilled Zimbabweans. The first significant finding is that 57% of the sampled population have given a “great deal” of thought to emigrating from Zimbabwe (with another 29% having given the matter some thought). Only 13% have given it no consideration. A comparison with South Africa is germane since that country is widely believed to be undergoing a crippling brain drain. In South Africa, only 31% of the skilled population have given a great deal of thought to emigrating, with 31% having not thought about it at all. In terms of gender breakdown, more women than men have given a great deal of thought to emigrating (62% versus 54%), which is the opposite of the South African scenario. In age terms, it is Zimbabweans in the 25-35 age group who have given most thought to emigrating. Nevertheless, levels of dissatisfaction are so high that the majority in each age group have given at least some thought to leaving. As SAMP has demonstrated elsewhere, thinking about leaving and actually doing so are not the same thing. The survey therefore sought to establish the extent to which skilled Zimbabweans have made a mental commitment to leaving within a certain time frame. Respondents were therefore asked about the likelihood of their leaving within the next six months, two years, and five years. Over a quarter (27%) said it was likely or very likely that they would leave in six months. Fifty five percent were committed to emigrating within the next two years. And 67% said they were committed to emigrating within the next five years. These are sobering statistics, unmatched in any other country in the region in which SAMP has done similar research. They suggest that the pool of future emigrants in Zimbabwe remains massive. The firmest indication of migration potential, however, is whether a person has acted on their desires by applying for emigration documentation. Many emigrants do not, of course, apply until they are already overseas. However, the survey found that nearly 20% of the resident skilled population had either applied for or were in the process of applying for a work permit in another country. Another question addressed by the survey concerns the “permanence” of intended or likely emigration. This is an important issue. Are people so disillusioned that they wish to leave forever or would they return if conditions improved for them at home? The survey found that 51% expressed a strong desire to leave permanently (for longer than 2 years), compared with only 25% who have a strong wish to only leave temporarily. Again, 43% said they would prefer to stay in their most likely emigration destination for more than 5 years. This is not therefore a population that sees emigration as temporary exile. Why are so many Zimbabweans thinking seriously about leaving? The reasons for this extraordinary state of affairs can be analysed at two levels. First, it is possible to point to economic and political events over the last decade as the primary cause of emigration and high future potential. These events are too well-known to be repeated here. Instead, this survey sought to obtain the opinions of skilled Zimbabweans themselves, to statistically measure levels and forms of dissatisfaction and disillusionment and relate these to high emigration potential. The survey discovered extremely high levels of dissatisfaction with the cost of living, taxation, availability of goods, and salaries. But the dissatisfaction goes deeper than economic circumstances to include housing, medical services, education and a viable future for children. South Africans actually show similar levels of economic dissatisfaction but they are far more optimistic about the future than Zimbabweans. Asked about the future, there was deep pessimism amongst skilled Zimbabweans, with the vast majority convinced that their personal economic circumstances would only get worse. They were also convinced that social and public services would decline further. The respondents were also asked about their perceptions of political conditions in the country. Here, too, there was considerable negativity and pessimism. Ratings of government performance were extremely low. Various measures have been mooted in Zimbabwe with a view to keeping skilled people in the country, including compulsory national service and bonding. A coercive approach to the brain drain has not worked particularly well elsewhere and often have the opposite effect to that intended. The survey showed that such measures would only add to the burden of discontent and for around 70% of respondents would make absolutely no difference to their emigration intentions. Zimbabwe faces an immense challenge in stemming the exodus to other countries within Africa and oversees. The basic conclusion of this study is that coercive measures will not work and that the best way to curb the high rates of skilled labour migration lies in addressing the economic fundamentals of the country which will ultimately improve living standards. Regretably, most skilled Zimbabweans are very pessimistic that this will happen in the foreseeable future